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Abstract

A fundamental disagreement among legal ethics scholars concerns the difference
between client-centered and justice-centered approaches to lawyers’ ethical obligations.
Advocates of client-centered approaches put lawyers’ duty to the client first. Justice-centered
theorists critique the elevation of the client’s interests over other important concerns lawyers
affect through the work they do on behalf of clients. Scholars who adopt justice-centered
approaches argue that lawyers’ ethical obligations should be analyzed with a paramount focus
on achieving justice.
Legal ethicists often view these two approaches as inconsistent with each other, but I
argue in this Article that they are not necessarily so. Building on the growing awareness of the
need for context-specific legal ethics analysis, I argue that a key factor responsible for the
disagreement between client- and justice-centered legal ethics scholars is their focus on different
practice settings, where different ethics concerns have priority. Ethicists concerned about the
immense power of corporate clients to do harm to fragile structures of public regulatory law
focus on lawyers’ duties to concern themselves with the underlying justice of their
representations, while ethicists immersed in practice settings involving the representation of
relatively powerless clients or interests, such as in criminal defense and poverty law practice,
are adamant about the need for client-centeredness. I argue that we can make much better sense
of the debate between client- and justice-centered ethicists if we appreciate the importance of
context in setting ethics priorities.
The challenge then becomes identifying the variables that account for the different
emphases of justice- and client-centered approaches. I suggest that a key factor underlying
ethicists’ varying views about the appropriate balance to be struck between client- and justicecenteredness is the relative power of the lawyer’s client in relation to other interests affected by
the representation. Of course, power is not, and should not be, the only factor taken into
account in calibrating ethics analysis to context, but it is an important one, which deserves
further attention in legal ethics scholarship.
I next propose a normative standard for how relative client power should be taken into
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consideration in lawyers’ ethical deliberations. In representations involving obvious and
substantial power imbalances, lawyers representing less powerful interests should adhere to a
client-centered, zealous advocacy approach, whereas lawyers for powerful clients should temper
their representations with an eye to protecting adequate consideration of the interests of the less
powerful. I identify several reasons why considerations based on relative client power should
factor into lawyers’ ethical deliberations in this way. These reasons include the representation
reinforcement function of zealous client advocacy on behalf of the under-represented interests
and the fact that the liberal underpinnings of client-centered legal ethics models support the
protection of the dignity of natural individuals, but not aggressive advocacy on behalf of the
interests of institutions that are mere creations of law.
Factoring client power into lawyers’ ethics analysis also avoids the powerful criticisms
leveled against justice-centered models on grounds that these approaches call for the
paternalistic substitution of lawyers’ socially situated judgments about morality and justice on
clients who are least able to resist such lawyer domination. Finally, consideration of client
power provides an ethics norm that pushes back most directly against the moral hazards
produced by self-interest in varying practice contexts. In the context of representing powerful
clients, lawyers’ incentive is to do too much for their clients; in the context of clients with
relatively little power, lawyers’ incentive is to do too little. An ethics norm that calls on lawyers
to temper their advocacy when representing powerful clients but to pursue client-centeredness
when representing clients with little power asks lawyers to correct for the specific pressures
faced in their practice locations.
To test my theory, I apply a power-based ethics model to a series of hypotheticals drawn
from the work of ethicists in the justice- and client-centered traditions. I show how considering
client power in resolving difficult ethical dilemmas in situations of obvious and substantial
power imbalance can help produce ethical judgments that are most appropriately tailored to
varying practice contexts.
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POWER AS A FACTOR IN LAWYERS’
ETHICAL DELIBERATION
I. INTRODUCTION
A fundamental disagreement among legal ethics scholars concerns the difference between
client-centered and justice-centered approaches to lawyers’ ethical obligations. Stated most
simply, advocates of client-centered approaches put lawyers’ duty to the client first. Scholars
closely identified with clinical legal education, poverty law, and indigent criminal defense
frequently advocate client-centered approaches.1 In contrast, justice-centered approaches critique
the elevation of the client’s interests over other important concerns lawyers affect through the
work they do on behalf of clients. Scholars who adopt justice-centered approaches argue that
lawyers’ ethical obligations should be analyzed with a paramount focus on achieving justice.
David Luban,2 William Simon,3 Robert Gordon,4 Deborah Rhode,5 Bradley Wendel,6 and
Russell Pearce7 are leading proponents of justice-centered approaches. It is less clear that these
1

See, e.g., Robert Dinerstein, Client-Centered Counseling: Reappraisal and Refinement, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 501
(1990); Binny Miller, Giving Them Back Their Lives: Recognizing Client Narrative in Case Theory, 93 MICH. L.
REV. 485 (1994); Lucie White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes of the Hearing
of Mrs. G., 38 BUFF. L. REV. 1 (1990); Charles J. Ogletree, Beyond Justifications: Seeking Motivations to Sustain
Public Defenders, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1239 (1993).
2

See, e.g., DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY (1988).

3

See, e.g., WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYERS’ ETHICS (1998).

4

See, e.g., Robert Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1 (1988).

5

See, e.g., DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: REFORMING THE LEGAL PROFESSION (2000).

6

See, e.g., W. Bradley Wendel, Civil Obedience, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 363 (2004).

7

See, e.g.., Russell G. Pearce, Rediscovering the Republican Origins of the Legal Ethics Codes, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 241 (1992).
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scholars come from shared practice locations--unless legal academia should be considered such a
location--but it does seem fair to characterize much of the work of these scholars as centrally
concerned with the way in which lawyers for relatively powerful clients, especially the huge
corporate entities that masquerade in law as “persons,” can cause great harm to the fragile fabric
of public regulatory law.
Legal ethicists often view these two approaches as inconsistent with each other, but I
argue in this Article that they are not. Instead, client-centered and justice-centered approaches
represent two potential emphases, and choices between them should be tailored to the context of
the legal representation. I propose a partial theory for how this calibration of ethics to context
should occur. Drawing on an insight shared among many contemporary legal ethics scholars, I
first note that ethics analysis must be context specific in some respects. David Wilkins and
others have forcefully developed this line of argument: the central concerns for ethics analysis
sometimes vary by practice setting.8
8

See David Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 799 (1992) (arguing that the best
institutional mechanisms for regulating lawyers vary with practice context). Wilkins perhaps has been the most
eloquent advocate of context-specific regulation, but a great many other scholars have by now pursued similar
points. See, e.g., Robert W. Gordon, A New Role for Lawyers?: The Corporate Counselor after Enron, 35 CONN. L.
REV. 1185 (2003); David Luban, Are Criminal Defenders Different?, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1729 (1993) (focusing on
issues such as “the balance of advantages in criminal prosecutions, and the balance of bargaining power, to justify
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the client-centered ethics of criminal defenders). Likewise, empirical scholars of the legal profession, such as Lynn
Mather and Tanina Rostain, have undertaken careful studies of how practice context correlates with differences in
lawyers’ perceptions of how to provide good legal services to their clients. See, e.g., LYNN MATHER, CRAIG A.
MCEWEN & RICHARD J. MAIMAN, DIVORCE LAWYERS AT WORK: VARIETIES OF PROFESSIONALISM IN PRACTICE
(2001) (study of different ethics orientations of differently situated divorce lawyers in small New England towns);
Tanina Rostain, Waking Up From Uneasy Dreams: Professional Context, Discretionary Judgment, and The
Practice of Justice, 51 STAN. L. REV. 955, 964-67 (1999) (summarizing empirical literature on how practice context
affects legal ethics orientation).
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For example, the legal ethics problems of most concern in lawyers’ representation of relatively
powerless persons are very different from the problems of most concern in lawyers’
representation of powerful institutional clients. At this historical moment in the development of
legal ethics thought this insight is well accepted, at least in some circles,9 but much work remains
to be done to incorporate this insight into the legal ethics analysis.10
The challenge I undertake in this Article is to probe why legal ethicists’ emphasis on the
priority of client- versus justice-centered considerations varies with practice context. What, for
example, accounts for the view of many justice-centered ethicists that it is okay to fight like hell
for a criminal defendant who has committed murder, but not for a corporate polluter who has
slightly increased the cancer risk in a surrounding community by negligence in controlling the
release of potentially toxic substances? Although it is difficult to argue that the murderer has
done less injustice than the careless corporation, many justice-centered legal ethicists still assert
that the murderer deserves client-centered representation while the corporate polluter does not.11
The task is to search for the underlying factors that produce such conclusions.
I propose in this Article that one important factor that accounts for these context-specific
results is the relative power of the client or interests being represented in comparison to the
power of the adversary and other interests at stake in the representation. Of course, client power
9

Not all legal ethicists, of course, share this view, but for purposes of my analysis here I wish to build of the work
of scholars who have defended this claim in order to further analyze how a context-based approach might work.

10

Indeed, to survey the new model rules the ABA Ethics 2000 Commission recently promulgated is to be reminded
that, where the “rules meet the road,” so to speak – that is, in the template to which states turn in drafting their rules
regulating lawyer conduct – much more work needs to be done to incorporate a context-specific approach into the
positive law that regulates lawyers’ practice. For a discussion of the limited ways in which the current ABA Rules of
Professional Conduct embrace context-specific ethics regulation, see note 77 infra.
11

See, e.g., Luban, supra note 8 (arguing that zealous advocacy is owed clients in criminal defense but not
corporate misconduct cases).
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is not – and should not be – the only factor guiding lawyers’ ethical judgments, but I argue here
that it is an important one in situations involving obvious and substantial power imbalances
among the interests affected by the representation.12
The next question is why relative client power should serve as a factor in guiding
lawyers’ exercise of ethical judgment in such situations. I propose several reasons. Most
basically, consideration of relative client power helps synthesize valuable aspects of client- and
justice-centered approaches and to target these approaches to the practice contexts in which they
are most appropriate. This tailoring helps improve the fit between these approaches and the
jurisprudential traditions on which they are based. A context-specific, power-sensitive legal
ethics norm resonates both with liberalism’s concerns for irresolveable pluralism and the
preservation of the dignity and voice of individuals, and with post-modernism’s insights into the
pervasive effects of power on actors’ conduct and perspectives. Concern about client power also
resonates with the core communitarian concerns of justice-centered theorists about the harm done
when lawyers engage in overly zealous advocacy for powerful clients bent on evading laws
designed to protect the public interest. Lawyers’ active agency in corporate misconduct scandals
such as Enron and the savings and loan crisis of the 1990s shows that professional conduct
regulation alone cannot stop lawyers from assisting with the commission of such harms; general

12

There are, of course, many other ways legal ethics analysis should be improved, and I do not pursue all of them
here. One reader, for example, has suggested that I should more vigorously attack the adversarial system. It may be
very well be that the legal system needs much reform in this respect, but my focus in this Article is different: I am
attempting to think through how legal ethics principles might be better designed even in a system that is extremely
flawed, not only in its procedural institutions, but also in swaths of substantively unjust law, as I discuss further in
Part I-A-1 infra. Similarly, another commentator has suggested that I should focus more on lawyers’ choice of
clients and general type of practice. I wholeheartedly agree that these are among the most important ethical
decisions lawyers make, and have indeed devoted another article to this topic. See Susan D. Carle, Re-Valuing
Lawyering for Middle-Income Clients, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 719 (2001). In this Article, however, my focus is on
lawyers’ appropriate conduct after accepting a particular representation.
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norms that guide lawyers’ exercise of discretionary judgment are needed as well, as I discuss
further below.13
Those ethics norms must push against the temptations of self-interest, and those
temptations vary dramatically depending on the relative power of lawyers’ clients. In the context
of representing powerful clients, lawyers’ incentive is to do too much for their clients; in the
context of clients with little power, lawyers’ incentive is to do too little. Attention to client
power as a factor in guiding lawyers’ exercise of ethical discretion thus provides an ethics norm
that resists the differential moral hazards produced by self-interest in different legal practice
locations. Lawyers’ calibration of the zealousness of their representation in inverse relationship
to their clients’ power offers a posture that most directly corrects for this tug of self interest, a
virtue surely important to ethics principles designed to preserve the profession’s integrity against
the pressures of business expediency.
Another important reason that client power should affect lawyers’ ethical analysis is that
adding this consideration tempers the flaws or extremes of pure client- or justice-centered
approaches. Justice-centered approaches face powerful criticisms on the grounds that they call
for the paternalistic substitution of lawyers’ judgments about matters of morality and justice for
those of those clients, especially clients who have few alternative options for obtaining legal
representation.14 Using relative client power to guide lawyers’ choices between client- and
justice-centered approaches prevents lawyers from imposing their own substantive visions of

13

See infra Part III-A.

14

See, e.g., Stephen Pepper, The Lawyer’s Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, A Problem, and Some Possibilities,
1986 AM B. FOUND. RES. J. 613 (“For access to the law to be filtered unequally through the disparate moral views of
each individual’s lawyer does not appear to be justifiable”).
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justice on clients who cannot easily walk away, while still calling on lawyers representing
powerful interests to refrain from exploiting opportunities that would bar adequate consideration
of less powerful interests affected by the representation. This approach indirectly has a justiceregarding aim, in that it seeks to permit something like “fair” or “just” ends to emerge from the
working of legal processes, but it does so without asking lawyers to impose their own substantive
views of the morality or justice of particular situations on those clients who can least resist.
I develop my argument in favor of consideration of relative client power as a factor in
lawyers’ ethical deliberations through the following steps: In Part II, I sketch the background to
the debate between client-centered and justice-centered approaches, and locate both approaches
in their respective jurisprudential underpinnings in order to explore the limits of their fit to
context. In Part III, I outline my argument about why, in situations involving obvious and
substantial power imbalances, relative client power should be a factor in lawyers’ ethical
deliberations, and respond to some of the more obvious objections raised by this proposal.
Finally, in Part IV, I test my model by applying it to a series of hypotheticals drawn from the
work of ethicists in the justice- and client-centered traditions. I demonstrate through these
concrete examples how attention to client power leads to an analysis somewhat different from
either of these two other alternatives, and argue why this analysis is superior to the results
produced by either alternative in its pure form. In short, a power-based analysis draws from
strengths of both client- and justice-centered perspectives, but better tailors those approaches to
the contexts their underlying principles support.

II.

THE DEBATE BETWEEN JUSTICE- AND CLIENT-CENTERED LEGAL
ETHICS APPROACHES
-4-

In this Part I sketch the recent history of the development of various schools of legal
ethics thought in order to situate the debate between client- and justice-centered approaches for
readers who are not legal ethics experts. Readers intimately familiar with these debates may
want to skip to Part III, though I hope through my explication to present a new way of thinking
about a fundamental divide in contemporary legal ethics theory that will help point to a synthesis
of these divergent traditions.
I group these traditions into two basic approaches: justice-centered views, which
emphasize lawyers’ duties to attend to the overall justice or morality of the issues they handle on
behalf of clients, and client-centered approaches, which emphasize lawyers’ duties to place their
clients’ interests above all other considerations except the bounds of law. I further discuss the
various critiques and responses these sets of legal ethics scholars make to each other and note
some of the jurisprudential influences important to each group.
A. The Justice-Centered View
The justice-centered approach to legal ethics analysis has complex historical origins.15 It
would be far too simple to assert that this view arises with the critical legal ethics scholarship of
the 1970s in the wake of Watergate, but its most recent origins can located there, in an important
article by philosopher Richard Wasserstrom,16 and in philosopher David Luban’s classic book,

15

See, e.g., Pearce, supra note 7 (locating justice-centered strains in antebellum legal ethics thought); Robert
Gordon, supra note 4 (examining a late nineteenth century model of corporate lawyering that emphasized lawyers’
independence from and wise discretionary judgment with respect to client representations); Susan Carle, Lawyers’
Duty to Do Justice: A New Look At the History of the 1908 Canons, 24 LAW & SOCIAL INQUIRY 1 (1999) (examining
complex ways in which duty-to-do-justice issues pervaded debate about first national model rules of legal ethics).

16

Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 NATURAL L. FORUM 1 (1975).
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The Good Lawyer.17 Wasserstrom, Luban, and others questioned lawyers’ justifications for
adopting a role-specific morality that allows them to pursue their clients’ interests within the
bounds of the law with near total disregard for the other interests affected by their
representations. Wasserstrom and Luban also sought to refute as a matter of moral philosophy
the non-accountability view of lawyers’ ethical obligations, which holds that lawyers should not
be held morally accountable for the positions they take and advocacy they engage in on behalf of
clients.18
Shortly after, starting in the early 1980s, William H. Simon, a brilliant, then young legal
scholar identified with the critical legal studies movement who had previously worked as a
poverty lawyer and clinical law teacher, began a systematic attack on client-centered ethics.
Simon’s early work falls very much in the critical legal studies mode of deconstruction, focused
on pointing out contradictions and poking holes in traditionally accepted jeremiads.19 In his later
work, however, Simon commits himself to the much harder task of re-construction – of
rebuilding the conceptual framework of legal ethics analysis along lines consistent with his
critique of client-centered advocacy.20 That work has taken him in a very different direction
than of most clinical theorists,21 even though his concerns about achieving greater justice in the
17

DAVID LUBAN, THE GOOD LAWYER: LAWYERS’ ROLES AND LAWYERS’ ETHICS (1983).

18

This position, however, is still embodied in the ABA Model Rules. See Model Rule 1.2(c).

19

See, e.g, William Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy, Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978 WISC. L.
REV. 29 (1978).
20

See, e.g., SIMON, supra note 3.

21

See, e.g., William H. Simon, The Dark Secret of Progressive Lawyering: A Comment on Poverty Law
Scholarship in the Post-Modern, Post-Reagan Era, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1099 (1994) (criticizing clinical and
poverty law scholars for misguided legal ethics analysis).
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American legal system remain at bottom very similar to theirs.
Both Simon and Luban draw on legal history for support of their arguments in favor of
justice-centered legal ethics, arguing that such conceptions flourished in lawyers’ ethics thinking
in prior historical periods.22 In this they had the important help of historian and critical legal
studies scholar Robert W. Gordon. Gordon has convincingly shown how a different view of
professional independence existed among elite corporate lawyers of the late 19th Century.23 He
has most recently continued to write, in the wake of Enron and other recent corporate scandals,
about how such a view should be restored in developing a separate set of legal ethics dictates for
corporate lawyers involved in regulatory compliance counseling work.24 Other scholars, such as
Russell Pearce,25 locate justice-centered approaches civic republicanism and turn-of-thetwentieth century Progressivism, and, in yet another line of exploration by Pearce, Thomas
Shaffer and others, in Judeo-Christian religion.26
1. The Legalists and Moralists
There are significant differences among the views of scholars who espouse justicecentered ethics approaches. One is that between those Wendell recently labeled the legalists and

22

See, e.g., SIMON, supra note 3, at 128 (invoking Brandeis as a figure exemplifying justice-centered lawyering));
Luban, supra note 2, at 238 (invoking Brandeis as a model of a lawyer committed to the public interest);
SIMONLUBAN, supra note 32, at 128234 (invoking Louis Brandeis’s notion of public interest lawyering as a
historical model for justice-centered lawyering).
23
24
25

See Gordon, supra note 4.
Gordon, supra note 8.
See Pearce, supra note 7.

26

See, e.g., Russell Pearce, The Jewish Lawyer’s Question, 27 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1259 (1996); Thomas L Shaffer,
Should a Christian Lawyer Serve the Guilty?, 23 GA. L. REV. 1201 (1989).
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the moralists.27 The moralists, who include not only Luban but also Rhode, Pearce, Shaffer, and
many others, view justice as based in moral intuitions or moral dictates that lie at least in part
outside the prescriptions of law.28 The legalists, to which school Simon and Wendell belong,
present sophisticated arguments that justice can be found in lawyers’ interpretations of legal rules
themselves.29 Simon espouses a sophisticated view of legal interpretation that allows lawyers to
probe beneath the dictates of positive law for the best, most generous understandings of its
normative purposes. For example, Simon reads into U.S. law a legal right to basic standards of
income maintenance,30 and acknowledges that there are broad swaths of law, such as criminal
justice, where his assumptions about the underlying justice of law’s purposes must be
suspended.31 Thus, Simon argues, “aggressive defense is justified because it subverts
punishment which, although formally prescribed, is unjustly harsh and discriminatory in terms of
the more general norms of the legal culture,”32 just as aggressive representation of the welfare
27
28

Wendel, supra note 6, at 369-73.
See LUBAN, supra note 2.

29

A symposium organized in honor of the publication of Simon’s book contains many thoughtful analyses of this
theory from leading proponents of moralist approaches. See Review Essay Symposium: The Practice of Justice by
William H. Simon, 51 STAN. L. REV. 867 (1999). Luban, writing as a so-called moralist under Wendel’s
classification scheme, argues that “[l]aw just isn’t that good,” and that moral intuition must be applied in making
ethical judgments. Luban, Reason and Passion in Legal Ethics, id. at 888, 898. Thomas Shaffer, writing from the
perspective of religious ethics, suggests that notions of justice from religious perspectives are “countercultural,” in
contrast to Simon’s model derived from the dominant culture. Thomas L. Shaffer, Should a Christian Lawyer Sign
Up for Simon’s Practice of Justice, id. at 917. Tony Alfieri urges greater consideration of the need for lawyers to
consider racial justice in crafting their representational strategies, Anthony V. Alfieri, (Er)Race-ing an Ethic of
Justice, id. at 935; and Robin West blasts Simon for his “romantic conception of the invariable goodness of law, and
the invariable illegality of injustice.” Robin West, The Zealous Advocacy of Justice in a Less than Ideal Legal
World, id. at 903, 973, 985.
30

See SIMON, supra note 3, at 148-40.

31

Id. at 189-90.

32

Id. at 189-90.
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recipient client is justified under broadly based legal norms not current instantiated in positive
law.33 Indeed, the key difference between Simon and the clinical and postmodern legal ethics
scholars he criticizes may amount to nothing more than a dispute about how broad these swaths
of unjust law are in our legal system, as I discuss further in Part V below.
Wendel, though also a legalist, has a somewhat different approach to law, in that he sees
its key purpose as serving a social coordination function. Wendel argues that a lawyer should
look to law as the authoritative statement of how society has chosen to coordinate relations
among its members, and should seek to carry out those purposes in client representations.34
Wendel’s explanation is helpful and important so far as it goes: To the extent that a lawyer is
dealing with law that has this social coordination function as its primary characteristic, there
seems little reason to object to Wendel’s legal ethics model.
The difficulty with Wendel’s approach arises with respect to the many areas of law that
have purposes different from or additional to social coordination. Law, for example, dictates
such matters as resource distribution and allocations of other basic rights subsumed under the
concept of justice. In these areas Wendel, like Simon, concedes that, if the fundamental justice
of law is uncertain, a legal ethics stance different from the one he proposes is necessary.35 In
those problematic areas of law, however broad (or not – a question I will leave to some other
day) an approach other than the legalists’ is required. A legalist perspective cannot work because
in these areas we are not confident about the fundamental justice of law and the results produced

33

Id. at 148-49.

34

See Wendel, supra note 6, at 378-79.

35

See id. at 148-49.
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through its operation. Significantly, these are the contexts about which poverty law and clinical
scholars tend to write, and it is thus no surprise that their legal ethics models, derived from
representation settings in which law’s fundamental justice may be in substantial doubt, are very
different from those of Simon and Wendell. Indeed, one piece of evidence that one may be
functioning in such a problematic area of the legal system is the presence of obvious and
substantial power imbalances among the parties involved in a legal dispute. This is one reason
why, in situations involving such obvious and substantial power imbalances, client power should
be a factor guiding lawyers’ exercise of ethical judgment, as I discuss further in Part III below.
Justice-centered theorists who espouse substantive moralist bases for legal ethics analysis
often draw on communitarian theories to support their positions. Their underlying
jurisprudential assumptions thus differ significantly from those of client-centered ethicists, who
tend to view law as involving an adversarial system of truth testing, and thus to emphasize the
importance of zealous advocacy of clients’ positions without regard for their justice in relation to
the public interest or community good.36 Justice-centered theorists’ communitarian perspective
is reflected in their strong interest in the historical traditions civic republicanism37 and turn-ofthe-twentieth-century progressivism,38 both of which assume the ability of actors to identify and
act in accordance with shared notions of the public interest. If community good or public interest
can be consensually or objectively identified, as lawyers during these historical moments

36

On adversarial legal ethics, see Richard Wasserstrom, supra note 16; David Luban, The Adversary Excuse, in
LUBAN, supra note 2, at 83.
37

See, e.g., Pearce, supra note 7; Gordon, supra note 4.

38

See, e.g., William H. Simon, Babbitt v. Brandeis: The Decline of the Professional Ideal, 37 STAN. L. REV. 487
(1980) (discussing Progressive Era lawyers as embodying a better model of professional ideals).
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believed, then the argument that lawyers should act with concern for the common good foremost
in mind in the course of representing clients is a strong one. But if notions of community good
or common interest are situated in social context and widely disparate, then it becomes difficult
to build a theory of ethics on lawyers’ obligation to act on the basis of their notions of what
justice requires. Such a theory ends up defensively dodging challenges that it endorses the
exercise of subjective judgment and the elitist domination of lawyers over clients.
In short, moralists face critiques based in modern and post-modern skepticism about the
objective ascertainability of such matters as truth, morality and justice. Arguments that lawyers
should do what they determine to be “just” under the circumstances collapse into moral or legal
relativism if such determinations are subjective: in acting in the interests of justice, lawyers will
simply be following their own personal preferences or those they hold by virtue of their social
locations.39 That idea appears of little use as a guide to legal ethics analysis. Thus, even the most
adamant justice-centered theorists must concede that a central problem with all versions of
justice-centered analysis is that, if we abandon the views of earlier historical eras that matters of
truth, morality and justice are objectively ascertainable, we lose an important component of the
justification for justice-centered legal ethics.
But even if justice-centered theorists’ focus on lawyers’ ability to ascertain correct
substantive results on questions of legal interpretation or morality fail to convince, it does not
follow that their work has nothing to offer. To the contrary, these theorists are very persuasive
on the inadequacy of client-centered legal ethics without more. As they point out, it surely
cannot be that lawyers, as officers of the legal system charged with upholding the purposes of the
39

Such arguments have been central in attacks on justice-centered views. See, e.g., Pepper, supra note 14.
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law and the working of legal processes, need not concern themselves with the effects of their
representations on the system of law and legal institutions in which they operate. It is at least
clear that the proper functioning of the legal system requires lawyers to act in such a way as to
preserve its continuing integrity and effectiveness. In other words, even if lawyers should not
impose their own views of substantive justice on their clients, they surely have a duty to help
protect the public purposes of law and legal institutions. The challenge is to identify how
lawyers should do this without running into the epistemological difficulties inherent in both
moralist and legalist justice-centered approaches.
2. Justice-Centered Ethics and Critical Theory
Simon was once a member of the critical legal studies movement and his work,
emphasizing the discretion and indeterminancy built into law, draws on some aspects of critical
legal studies.40 But he is not a comfortable fellow traveler with most of those who identify
themselves as critical theorists today.41 Indeed, there is some irony in the fact that Simon, an
early “crit,” should now insist that law provides the source of determinate substantive dictates in
legal ethics analysis. Simon recognizes and addresses this irony in the following passage:
My friends and teachers in Critical Legal Studies devoted a good
deal of effort to extending the Realist critique of the objectivity of
the legal reasoning associated with judges and demonstrating the
relative “indeterminacy” of judicial doctrine. We thought that the
mainstream tendency to exaggerate objectivity and determinacy
gave an undeserved legitimacy to the work of the
40

In Practice of Justice, Simon relies almost exclusively on Ronald Dworkin’s quite different theory of flexible but
determinate legal interpretation in Taking Rights Seriously, RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 81-130
(1978) (discussing how judges reach correct results in hard cases).
41

In some ways, of course, Simon clearly is a critical theorist, in light of his willingness to challenge sacred
assumptions and turn traditional analysis on its head. See, e.g., Note, Rethinking the Professional Responsibilities of
Federal Agency Lawyers, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1171, 1182 & n. 60 (2002) (calling Simon’s legal ethics model a
“critical model”).
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centrist/conservative judiciary. We hoped that such critique would
loosen things up for Progressive politics.
I have always thought that this was an important and worthwhile
project, but it was apparent to me from the beginning that the
situation was quite different with lawyers’ ethics. Here skepticism
is the mainstream tendency. Here it is the assertion of
indeterminacy and subjectivity that serves to legitimate a
conservative status quo.42
What Simon does not sufficiently acknowledge in this passage is that skepticism as a
posture toward claims of justice in the context of legal ethics analysis can have multiple origins.
The traditional one is based on classical liberal justifications for adversarial, individual-rights
approaches to legal representation. Another, however, arrives at similar conclusions from a very
different starting point, locating the need for skepticism about moral truths and for restraint in a
lawyer’s imposition of her own values on clients in a very different understanding of the dangers
and pervasiveness of power as a “force field” bending well meaning efforts away from conscious
intent.43
Similarly, Simon attributes the “indeterminacy and subjectivity” approach to questions of
justice to traditionalists who defend the status quo,44 without recognizing that justice-centered
approaches are similarly associated with a flawed status quo characterized by a paternalistic,
lawyer-dominated notions of public interest law. Scholars of the history of public interest law
have noted the ways in which elite public interest lawyers have stood in the way of their clients’

42

William Simon, The Legal and the Ethical in Legal Ethics: A Brief Rejoinder to Comments on The Practice of
Justice, 51 STAN. L. REV. 991, 992 (1999).
43

On this Foucauldian notion of power as applied to lawyering analysis, see, e.g., Lucie White, Seeking the Face of
Otherness, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1499, 1501-02 (1992).
44

See Simon, supra note 42, at 992.
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wishes and desires, unreflective about the sometimes counterproductive effects of their own
socially situated perspectives on the development of those movements.45
In all events, Simon, along with many other justice-centered theorists, has been
indifferent at best and hostile at worst to the virtues of critical theory for legal ethics analysis.
But some strains of critical legal theory would seem to have useful application to questions about
lawyering in situations of substantial power imbalance, especially since that is the political
context on which critical theory tends to focus. It thus seems well worth exploring the potential
applicability of these strains of critical theory to legal ethics analysis. Again somewhat
ironically, it is theorists with client-centered legal ethics perspectives who have begun to do this
work.
B. Client-Centered Approaches
Client-centered, zealous advocacy approaches to legal ethics analysis have several
origins. Again taking the 1970s as a somewhat arbitrary starting point for a quick historical
overview, one would point to Charles Fried’s classic article, “The Lawyer As Friend,” as the
paradigmatic traditional expression of this view.46 Monroe Freedman defended a similar
approach, focusing on the criminal defense context but discussing corporate representation as
45

See, e.g., Clyde Spillenger, Elusive Advocate: Reconsidering Brandeis as People’s Lawyer, 105 YALE L. J. 1445
(1996) (critiquing Brandeis’s lack of engaged involvement with his public interest clients); Norman W. Spaulding,
The Myth of Civic Republicanism: Interrogating the Ideology of Antebellum Legal Ethics, 71 FORDHAM L. REV.
1397 (2003) (critiquing the way in which civic republican models of lawyers’ ethics ignore class dimensions of this
professional ideology); David B. Wilkins, Class Not Race in Legal Ethics: Or Why Hierarchy Makes Strange
Bedfellows, 20 LAW & HIST. REV. 147 (2002). (questioning motivations of patrician lawyers involved in the early
NAACP); Susan D. Carle, Re-envisioning Models for Pro Bono Lawyering: A Comparative Study of the Early
NAACP and the National Consumers League, 9 AM. U. J. OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY AND LAW 81 (2001)
(discussing benefits and drawbacks of elite lawyers’ involvement in two early national public interest law
organizations).
46

Charles Fried, The Lawyer As Friend: the Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L. J. 1060
(1976).
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well.47 At around the same time, civil rights and poverty lawyers were developing clientcentered theories of client representation from other angles,48 and this work developed still
further after many former poverty movement lawyers found homes in legal academia as
clinicians, pioneering clinical legal scholarship as an intellectual force that sought to pull legal
academia’s focus more toward analyzing actual client representations.
1. Criminal Defense
All contemporary ethicists, including those in the justice-centered tradition, agree that
arguments for zealous client advocacy are most persuasive in the criminal defense context.49 I
will suggest in Part IV-B-2 below that this is because criminal defense presents the context where
it is most plausible to impose a strong presumption as to the potentially overwhelming power of
the state, pitted against a comparatively powerless individual threatened with deprivation of life
and liberty. But Freedman and other legal ethicists writing about the criminal defense context do
not explicitly espouse context-specific analysis, and sometimes make the same arguments about
the importance of zealous client advocacy in quite different practice settings, such as in lawyers’
representation of publicly traded corporations before the Securities and Exchange Commission.50
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See MONROE FREEDMAN, LAWYERS’ ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM (1975).

48

See, e.g., Stephen Wexler, Practicing Law for Poor People, 79 YALE L.J. 1049 (1970); Edgar S. and Jean Camper
Cahn, Power to the People or the Profession?–-The Public Interest in Public Interest Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1005
(1970); and Gary Bellow, Turning Solutions Into Problems: The Legal Aid Experience, 24 NLADA Briefcase 106
(Aug. 1977).
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See, e.g., SIMON, supra note 3, at 187-94 (presenting justifications for zealous advocacy in the criminal defense
context); Luban, supra note 8 (arguing that context of criminal defense supports client-centered, zealous advocacy
ethics stance).
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See, e.g., FREEDMAN, supra note 47, at 21-24 (berating the SEC, in arguments foreshadowing the corporate bar’s
indignation following enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, for taking the position that lawyers should curtail the
zeal of their advocacy in their representations of clients before the Commission in order to safeguard the purposes of
federal securities law). Other scholars associated with criminal defense representation, including Charles Ogletree
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I will suggest that these scholars’ key analytical mistake in what is otherwise sound reasoning
occurs here – in assuming that an ethical stance developed in one practice context should be
transferred outside it.
2. The Clinical Scholarship Movement
Another line of client-centered ethics theory comes from the clinical legal education
movement’s concern with legal ethics issues arising in the representation of low-income clients.
Such writing often focuses on narratives involving the representation of disguised actual clients,
and seeks to capture and analyze the micro-dynamics of the operation of power between lawyer
and client. Classics include Lucie White’s iconic piece in which her client, Mrs. G., employs a
far more creative litigation strategy than that which White, then a legal services lawyer, had
advised.51 The case involves a hearing to determine whether Mrs. G. must return money received
due to a welfare officer’s accidental overpayment of benefits. White analyzes the complicated
relations of power, race, class and gender among Mrs. G., the welfare department social worker
responsible for the payment error who is pursuing the hearing, and White, who had grown up in
the region but is very much set apart from the other actors in the story by race, class privilege,

and Abbe Smith, have similarly and persuasively defended the zealous advocacy model for the ethics of public
defenders. See, e.g., Ogletree, supra note 1; Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., An Essay on the New Public Defender of the
21st Century, 58-Winter LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 81 (1995); Barbara Babcock, Defending the Guilty, 32
CLEVELAND STATE L. REV. 175 (1983). Smith, a clinical law teacher closely associated with Freedman, frequently
emphasizes the importance the criminal defense context makes. See, e.g., Abbe Smith, The Difference in Criminal
Defense and the Difference It Makes, 11 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 83 (2003) (arguing that the degree of zealous
representation appropriate in the context of criminal defense is different from civil cases in light of many differences
between these representational contexts); see also Abbe Smith & William Montross, The Calling of Criminal
Defense, 50 MERCER L. REV. 443, 445-47 (1999) (making a special defense of zealous advocacy on the part of
public defenders, by noting that the majority of those accused of crimes are poor people, the percentage of poor
people among those convicted of crimes is even greater, and the clients of criminal defense lawyers are also
disproportionally nonwhite). But Smith, too, sometimes asserts that the same principle of zealous advocacy should
apply in all settings. See, e.g., Smith, supra, at 137.
51

See White, supra note 1.

-16-

law school education, and her power and authority as an attorney.
The story’s punch line involves Mrs. G’s decision on the witness stand to disregard
White’s advice and instead present a narrative about her need to preserve her human dignity by
buying Sunday shoes for her children.52 After the hearing, the welfare department decides to
drop the case against Mrs. G, and White realizes that she had failed to understand, across lines of
class, race, and legal training and authority, her client’s perspective and wisdom in formulating a
narrative or theory for her case.
As the Mrs. G. study demonstrates, client-centered lawyering literature seeks to
deconstruct traditional assumptions about the ease with which lawyers can ascertain and advocate
for their clients’ interests. In noting the difficulties of lawyering across lines of class and
education and other axes of social difference, these scholars have forced more sophistication in
legal ethicists’ awareness of the distinction between zealous advocacy and client-centeredness.
Client-centeredness encompasses but does not stop at zealous advocacy; lawyers must also strive
to understand their clients’ self-perceived interests, rather than imposing stock legalist
viewpoints about what clients’ interests in the representation should be.
These scholars’ case-study methodology also allows them to closely examine the microdynamics of client-centered counseling. Clinical scholars describe a collaborative interaction
between client and lawyer. They insist that client-centered representation involves neither simply
accepting the client’s statement of goals and interests as articulated at the outset of a
representation, nor imposing one’s own views of the goals and interests the client should wish to
pursue. Instead, client-centered counseling at its best involves an exchange of information,
52

Id.
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knowledge and perspectives between client and lawyer, from which both parties and the quality
of the legal representation gain. Key to this dialogic process, however, is the ultimate right of the
client to decide on both the goals and the means used in the legal representation.53 Thus, clientcentered theorists insist, in the end, if client and lawyer fail to see eye-to-eye after such reciprocal
dialogue, it is the client’s wishes that should prevail.54 Clinical scholars have identified many
reasons why client-centeredness is appropriate in their practice context;55 one important one is
that it preserves the relative power of the client in relation to the lawyer whose position of
relative social privilege could otherwise easily lead to domination over the client.56
3. Rebellious or Community Lawyering
Another strain of client-centered lawyering theory that arises out of but in some ways sets
itself apart from the classic client-centered lawyering literature goes by the name of rebellious or
community lawyering. Advocates of this approach, including Gerald López,57 Lucie White58 and
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many others,59 have developed models of client-centeredness that focus on understanding poor or
otherwise disadvantaged clients in the context of their communities.60 Rebellious and
community-based lawyering theorists also emphasize exploration of creative lawyering strategies
and the breaking down of distinctions between lawyering and community organizing techniques.
What makes supporters of this approach similar to classic client-centered lawyering theorists is
their focus on relatively powerless or disadvantaged clients, communities, and interests, and their
insistence that lawyers should seek to refrain from dominating their clients and instead should
strive to help client communities discover and pursue their interests as they themselves perceive
them.
Simon has critiqued these genres of legal ethics scholarship on a number of grounds,
some of which have merit but some of which do not. Simon notes, for example – correctly to my
mind – that the clinical client-centered lawyering literature has many elements that are similar to
the traditional client autonomy view.61 He also argues – again correctly, to my mind – that
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Jane Murphy, Lawyering for Social Change: The Power of the Narrative in Domestic Violence Law Reform, 21
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1243 (1993); William Quigley, Reflections of Community Organizers: Lawyering for
Empowerment of Community Organizations, 21 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 455 (1994); Scott L. Cummings & Ingrid V.
Eagly, A Critical Reflection on Law and Organizing, 48 UCLA L. REV. 443 (2001); Michael Diamond, Community
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clinical legal scholarship can become too exclusively focused on the micro-dynamics of client
lawyer interactions at the expense of important broader questions about effective strategies for
political change.62 But he incorrectly asserts that these scholars deny that lawyers exercise
ethical discretion in lawyering and claim they can refrain from imposing any values or power in
their client relationships.63 That is far from what these scholars claim; their project instead is to
reflect on and develop better ethical practices in order to guide the exercise of their power and
discretion. Nor does it at all follow from the valid aspects of Simon’s critique that poverty law
scholars’ general ethics project is illegitimate: surely close reflective analysis of how ethical
discretion operates in lawyer relationships with poor clients can help in the development of
ethical norms appropriate to this practice context.
Simon correctly observes that post-modern theory has strongly influenced some scholars
affiliated with the client-centered and rebellious lawyering movements and that this influence is
in part responsible for the movements’ drastic scaling down of their political ambitions.64 But to
say that the lawyering theory of the poverty law movement has become too focused on microdynamics at the expense of theorizing strategies for broader-scale political change is not to say
that it is not political at all. Critical lawyering theorists do not see representation of relatively
62
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powerless clients as merely providing “psychological” therapy.65 Their hope is that lawyering
interactions present small-scale moments of possible client empowerment. This idea stems from
post-modernists’ claims that the micro-dynamics of power’s operation in the flux and confusion
of local, particular situations creates opportunities for resistance and change.66 Their underlying
faith commitment is that the development through reflective analysis of an ethics of respect and
restraint will produce better client-lawyer interactions – i.e., ones more likely to lead to effective
large-scale political action – than ones in which lawyers unduly and unreflectively dominate their
clients.67
A second contribution post-modernism offers legal ethics theory is a wariness about the
effects of power relationships in shaping actors’ socially constructed consciousness.
65
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See, e.g., White, supra note 43 (applying late twentieth century social theory to a micro-analysis of lawyering).
Or, as López writes:
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LÓPEZ, supra note 57, at 41-42.
67

I have attempted to begin to think about a legal ethics model based on respect and restraint in the context of
lawyering for public interest law movements in Susan Carle, How Should We Theorize Class Interests in Thinking

-21-

Recognizing the insidious and pervasive operation of power and ideology in all facets of social
interaction, post-modern lawyering theorists are particularly suspicious of claims to know the
common good. Those claims are tainted by – indeed pervaded by – the interests of the dominant
class.68 In this respect post-modernism as applied to legal ethics analysis produces results more
like traditional liberalism’s emphasis on the need for zealous client advocacy than like those
stemming from the strains of communitarianism that support justice-centered legal ethics
perspectives. Post-modernism is skeptical of claims to know a common good that stands apart
from political struggle. It is also deeply doubtful about the possibilities for progress or lack of
co-optation in that political struggle between the more and the less powerful. But it sees that
struggle going on all the time, in the many interstices and contested local battlegrounds of daily
social life. Lawyers whose legal ethics perspectives are influenced by these strains of critical
theory strive to take part in that struggle on the side of the less powerful. Their legal ethics
literature is based on these post-modernist-influenced understandings – on developing principles
that help make those sites in which lawyers participate in political struggle more about resistence
to entrenched forms of power and less about perpetuating the domination of those with power
and privilege, including lawyers, over those with relatively few such resources. As an aspiration,
that idea surely has much merit as one aspect of the development of a legal ethics analysis
suitable for lawyering across social differences and on behalf of those with the least social
advantage.

About Professional Regulation?,
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In short, in contrast to Simon, I view the literature developed out of the poverty law and
clinical legal education movements as largely on the right track in focusing on how to enhance
client perspectives and empowerment in the context of lawyering relationships with persons,
groups and interests with little social, economic, political, or legal power. The key challenge,
however, is to reconcile this view of lawyers’ appropriate ethics stance with justice-centered
theorists’ convincing showing of the potential harm overly aggressive client advocacy can do to
the public interest. My argument is that a key aspect of that reconciliation requires embracing
legal ethics approaches with emphases that differ depending on practice location.
4. Corporate Representation
Thus far, I have described client-centered legal ethics theory that arises out of practice
contexts involving the representation of relatively powerless individuals and communities. My
description has not covered the entire territory, however; some prominent spokespersons for
client-centered lawyering write from the context of corporate representation.69 But these
traditionalists represent the old guard. Public policy trends away from strict lawyer
confidentiality in the face of serious danger to the public interest and toward greater lawyer
activism in investigating and correcting wrongdoing by organizational clients suggest that the
course of legal ethics regulation is sweeping past these commentators’ objections.70 Arguments
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for zealous client advocacy on behalf of enormously powerful corporations fail to pack the
persuasive punch they once did in light of successive waves of corporate scandals in which
lawyers played a significant role. It has simply become increasing hard to explain how the
proper overall working of legal system is enhanced when lawyers for savings and loan companies
stonewall federal regulators so that investors lose billions more before their clients’ insolvency
and financial mismanagement is uncovered, or approve sham transactions and then engage in a
pitifully inadequate internal investigation of a whistleblower’s misconduct charges in the course
of the events leading to the collapse of Enron.71 In all of these scandals, a key aspect of the
lawyers’ conduct that commentators later found objectionable involved lawyers’ adherence to a
strongly client-centered, zealous advocacy ethics stance. Yet in most instances these lawyers’
actions failed to cross the line beyond the conduct permitted under legal ethics rules.72 These
scandals have thus exacerbated the crisis of confidence about the effectiveness of current clientcentered models of legal ethics regulation. As many leading legal ethics scholars have
persuasively argued in their autopsies of these and other corporate scandals, the time for contextspecific approaches to lawyer regulation has arrived.73

lawyer reasonably believes necessary . . . to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer
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III. POWER AS A FACTOR IN LAWYERS’ ETHICAL DELIBERATIONS
A. The Importance of Discretion in Lawyers’ Ethical Judgment
The savings and loan and Enron scandals helped focus attention on the fact that lawyers
continually exercise discretionary ethical judgment in their client representations; the positive
prescriptions legal ethics rules supply cannot determine by themselves what lawyers can or
should do in all instances. Indeed, one of Simon’s many important contributions to legal ethics
study is his insight into the important role discretion plays in lawyers’ ethical judgment.74 Simon
persuasively argues that such discretion operates continuously and unavoidably in all lawyers’
practice decisions.
That positive law lacks determinacy in this respect is by no means a new insight, of
course. As H.L.A. Hart convincingly established long ago, positive law is always rife with gaps
and ambiguities that require the application of discretionary judgment.75 This is particularly the
case with regard to legal ethics rules that regulators have drafted to apply across the entire
profession. These rules are often purposely left broad so as to provide general guidelines that can
be adapted to the particularities of disparate practice settings. It is this indeterminancy in the
positive dictates of ethics law that left lawyers in the savings and loan and Enron scandals to
operate within a zone of discretion in which their general normative orientation toward zealous
74
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client-centeredness, rather than limits set by the rules, dictated their conduct. For the same
reason, regulators were unable to prosecute these lawyers successfully for violations of legal
ethics law; they were unable to show that these lawyers’ conduct went beyond the wide bounds
set by the law regulating lawyers’ conduct.76
Thus a key aspect of reforming the lawyers’ conduct requires a shift in lawyers’ general
normative orientation, rather than mere altered prescriptions contained in legal ethics rules
themselves. Following Simon and others who seek to propose new approaches to legal ethics
analysis, I will focus in this Article primarily on this dimension of lawyers’ discretionary
judgment. In other words, I am seeking to carve the dimensions of and defend the general
principle of a contextual approach that looks for factors that should guide lawyers’ ethical
deliberation, rather undertaking at this point to propose new rules. The general principles I
explore here certainly could lead to revisions in the ethics rules as well, but that focus must await
a future project.77
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It also bears emphasizing before I proceed that my argument in favor of lawyers’
consideration of relative client power in their everyday discretionary ethical judgment calls is not
that lawyers should abandon general dictates against breaking the law, falsifying evidence,
suborning perjury, or any of a number of other limits, but instead focuses on ethics analysis
within limits that are appropriate in all contexts. Put otherwise, the argument that lawyers should
consider power as a factor in ethical analysis does not propose that lawyers should disregard the
boundaries set by law and professional conduct rules, but address the – often quite large – area of
bounded discretion in which normative orientation guides decisions in the everyday choices, both
large and small, that confront practicing lawyers.78
In this area of bounded discretion, my proposal for consideration of relative client power
in resolving close ethical judgment calls would work as follows: lawyers for clients with
substantially greater power relative to that of other interests affected by the representation should
strive to temper the zealousness of their client advocacy with an eye to protecting consideration
of those less powerful interests. In contrast, lawyers for clients with substantially less power – in
other words, lawyers representing “underdogs” vis-a-vis powerful interests – should be guided
by the ethical principle of zealous, client-centered representation. In the middle range of cases,
involving representations of clients with substantially equivalent power or power relationships
that are sufficiently complex or multifaceted as to produce indeterminate results under a powerbased test, consideration of relative client power should not come into play in guiding lawyers’
ethical judgments. Thus, as I discuss further in Part IV below, my proposal for consideration of
apply as a matter of general principle.
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relative client power as a factor in legal ethics analysis applies only to some representations,
involving obviously and substantial power imbalances among affected interests, and leaves the
rest of the terrain to other ethics theories. But as I hope I have persuaded in Part I, the
disagreement between the justice- and client-centered theorists arises precisely because advocates
of each approach are writing with a focus on the disparate practice settings of corporate and
individual client representation, respectively, where power imbalances tend to be the most
salient. Before discussing through concrete hypotheticals how a context-specific ethics norms
focused on relative client power would work, however, I make the case for why client power
should make a difference at all.
B. Why Factor Client Power into Lawyers’ Ethical Judgments?
The preliminary question presented is, why should relative client power make a difference
to legal ethics analysis? I consider four possible reasons why this should be so. In doing so, I
consider the jurisprudential bases for client-centered legal ethics in traditional liberal theory and
the understandings of the importance of power in legal and political processes developed by both
liberal and critical legal theorists. I also examine the assumptions that underlie the widely held
consensus, shared by client- and justice-centered theorists alike, that the legal ethics principles
applicable to criminal defense representation are and should be different. Finally, I point out the
way in which considering client power rather than assessing the underlying “justice” of particular
cases avoids some of the critiques that have been leveled against justice-centered ethics theories.
1. The Representation Reinforcement Function of Zealous Advocacy
As many legal ethics scholars have noted, the legal ethics norm of zealous, client-
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centered advocacy has its origins in classical liberal jurisprudence.79 John Rawls, the leading
contemporary spokesperson for liberal political theory, describes its main task as theorizing the
rules for a just and fair society under conditions of irresolveable pluralism. Different citizens
hold incommensurable comprehensive doctrines and that this incommensurablity of world views
cannot be resolved.80 As already noted, this fact of irresolveable pluralism provides an important
rationale for client-centered, zealous advocacy legal ethics models. If no one has the upper hand
in determining what constitutes justice, then the testing of clients’ positions through zealous
advocacy appears to be the only way to determine “just” results.81
In any event, as Rawls further states, the task for liberal political theory is to determine
the rules or procedures to which citizens would agree for the just and fair operation of public
institutions under these conditions of irresolveable pluralism. One method of determining rules
for the operation of fair and just public institutions involves application of the difference
principle. That principle holds that rules are just to extent that they would be agreed to from the
hypothetical “original position”– i.e., before persons knew about their relative advantages or
disadvantages in the conditions of their actual lives – and that the rules that would be agreed to
from this hypothetical original position are those that make the least advantaged persons better
off than they otherwise would be. Advantage or disadvantage is measured according to persons’
access to “primary goods,” or those “conditions and means” generally necessary to allow citizens
79
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to pursue human flourishing and their diverse conceptions of the good.82
Rawls is careful to emphasize that these conditions apply only to the operation of public
institutions, but it seems fairly clear that one such institution for Rawls is the legal system.83
Whether for Rawls the rules governing lawyers’ conduct within the legal system would similarly
be subject to the basic principles of justice is far less clear;84 Rawls never writes at this level of
specificity or application, and it would take me too far away from the central purpose of this
Article to attempt such an application here. But it suffices to say that access to justice should be
classified as a primary good.85 If this is so, then under the difference principle rules that promote
less advantaged citizens’ access to justice are to be favored over those that do not. A rule that
grants less advantaged clients access to justice through the provision of zealous, client-centered
advocacy fits well in general terms within the difference principle approach. Zealous, clientcentered advocacy for the least advantaged members of society provides enhanced access to
justice for them and in this way enhances the overall fairness of the public institution of law.
Other general principles of liberalism similarly support client-centered ethics principles
within a framework sensitive to substantial power imbalances.86 One of these, inherited from
82
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John Stuart Mills, involves the principle that all, even the most disadvantaged, be permitted to
compete in the marketplace of ideas.87 The legal system, as a site in that market place, offers a
forum in which voices or perspectives can compete in the development of public reason. But if
only some voices have the power to compete, there is no such free marketplace – ideas are
competing based on the power of the voice, not the merits of the ideas. Contemporary liberal
jurisprudence, then, supports the idea of zealous advocacy within the legal system on issues of
public policy to the extent of amplifying voices so that all can be adequately heard, but not the
further amplification through aggressive legal representation of already strong voices so that they
drown out those with less volume.88 This is a second, representation reinforcement reason for
providing the least advantaged members of society with zealous, client-centered legal advocates.
These two general ideas are embedded in contemporary models of public interest law.89
Those models, which appear to have first arisen in the context of the poverty law movement of
the 1970s, set themselves against earlier Progressive-Era models for public interest lawyering
that were based on notions of promoting the public interest detached from the perspectives of
particular clients.90 In contrast to these earlier tradition, the 1970s poverty-law model defined
87

See, e.g., JOHN STUART MILL, Of Individuality, as One of the Elements of Well-Being, in ON LIBERTY 53, 53-54
(Elizabeth Rapaport ed., Hackett Publ’g Co. 1978) (1859) (discussing the need for a robust exchange of ideas to
challenge unreliable orthodoxies).
88

Similar arguments can be made within the framework of classical pragmatism’s concern about creating the
conditions for participatory democracy. See, e.g., Susan D. Carle, Theorizing Agency, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 307, 36062 (2005) (discussing Dewey’s concern about creating the conditions for participatory democracy by empowering
all voices with the skills and mind set necessary to engage in deliberative processes).
89

See, e.g., Edgar S. Cahn & Jean Camper Cahn, Power to the People or the Profession?--The Public Interest in
Public Interest Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1005, 1006-07 (1970) (arguing that public interest law should confine itself to
representing the poor and disenfranchised).
90

For a more extensive discussion of this contrast between early twentieth century and contemporary ideas about
public interest law, see Carle, supra note 12, at 732-38.

-31-

public interest law as giving voice to members of groups under-represented in the political
process and underprivileged in terms of economic and social resources and benefits.91
These ideas in turn connect with legal ethics prescriptions. Zealous, client-centered
representation makes sense as an ethics model where it is directed at amplifying the voices of
those whose voices are not as loud. But the same rationale does not apply to the amplification
through zealous advocacy of the voices of those whose voices are already strong. A liberal
jurisprudence conceived along these lines thus supports the idea of a client-centered ethics within
bounds, with the degree of zealousness of lawyers’ representation of clients tempered by
concerns about the representation reinforcement function of lawyers’ advocacy.92
Of course, it is not always the case that legal representation of less advantaged members
of society involves giving voice to perspectives or interests that should be heard in order to
further public reason. The representation enforcement idea does not, for example, support the
notion of zealous advocacy for the acquittal and release into the community of an impecunious
serial murderer. Thus the principle of representation reinforcement can do some work in
explaining why client power should be a factor in lawyers’ ethics analysis in situations of
substantial power imbalance, but it cannot fully explain why a client’s relative power
91
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disadvantage should entitle him or her to zealous, client-centered advocacy. Here other liberal
jurisprudential considerations must also come into play. Those principles appear to reside
primarily in liberal jurisprudential assumptions about the inherent value and dignity of
individuals. In the case of legal representation of the murderer, liberal jurisprudential principles
posit that the murderer has dignitary and liberty rights that deserve protection against state power,
even separate from the political considerations that support vigorous advocacy of excluded
voices on legal-political issues of public concern.
2. Liberalism’s Concern for the Dignitary Rights of Individuals,
Not Corporations
The liberal emphasis on the dignitary rights of individuals thus forms another important,
but not unbounded, justification for client-centered advocacy in some but not all representation
contexts. It provides a key aspect of the justification for zealous advocacy in the criminal
defense context. In Freedman’s words,
Under our adversary system, the interests of the state are not
absolute, or even paramount. The dignity of the individual is
respected to the point that even when the citizen is known by the
state to have committed a heinous offense, the individual is
nevertheless accorded such rights as counsel, trial by jury, due
process, and the privilege against self-incrimination.93
In other words, the constitutional protections and zealous advocacy accorded defendants in
criminal trials aim at a purposeful tipping or “unleveling” of the playing field in this
representation context. The standard justification for creating this unlevel playing field in
criminal cases is that the state has enormous potential power and the criminal defendant has
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relatively little.94 Thus role-specific ethics rules apply to prosecutors and defense counsel, under
which the prosecutor is to attend to the “justice” of her case while defense counsel is to represent
her client with the maximum zealousness permitted within the rules. The value of protecting
individual dignity and rights against the potentially overwhelming force of the state justifies the
lack of reciprocity in the ethical obligations owed by lawyers on the two sides. But there is no
inherent reason why the same justifications based on substantial disparities in client power
should not also apply in defining lawyers’ respective ethical considerations in civil matters that
similarly have profound effects on clients’ interests.
The foundation of client-centered legal ethics principles in liberalism’s emphasis on the
value of individuals also illuminates the fallacy of applying client-centered ethics to the
representation of clients who are not individuals at all, but are instead legal fictions
masquerading as natural entities by virtue of the constitutive power of law. Liberal ideas
concerning the primacy of the rights of natural persons have no place in the context of
representing entities lacking natural status, not only because organizations may possess enormous
power, but also because they are not individuals at all. To be sure, organizations are granted the
status of persons for some legal purposes, but only as a convenient fiction.95 This fiction works
for some purposes but not all, and there is no inherent reason why the fiction should apply in
legal ethics analysis. Indeed, the objections of many liberal legal theorists to the lack of
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restrictions on the “free speech” rights of corporations in the context of political campaigns 96
can be applied with equal force to rules that fail to restrict the zealousness of lawyers’ promotion
of corporations’ interests in the legal arena. Limiting client-centered ethics based in liberal
jurisprudence to its core concern with the dignity and equality of individuals avoids the error of
applying this concept to the very different context of representing entities that are no more than a
creation of law and thus justifiably constrained by it. This prescription returns a legal ethics
analysis based in liberal jurisprudence back to its concern with the dignity and equality of
individuals and corrects the error of applying an orientation appropriate to the representation of
relatively powerless individuals fighting against the power of the state to the very different
context of corporate legal representation.
The context of corporate representation is different from the context of individual client
representations for other reasons as well. A key one, which Wilkins persuasively identified in his
seminal article on the need for context-specific regulation,97 is the fact that very different moral
hazards typically exist in the context of large corporation versus individual client representations.
In the context of representing powerful clients, such as large corporations, lawyers’ incentive is
to do too much for their clients; in the context of representing individual clients, who typically
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(but not always) have with relatively little power, lawyers’ incentive is to do too little.
3. Correcting for the Moral Hazards of Self-Interest
Thus a third argument for why relative client power should play a role in lawyers’ ethical
deliberations involves the importance of promoting an ethical principle that most precisely and
directly pushes against the differential moral hazards presented in disparate practice locations.
An ethics norm that calls on lawyers to stay their hands or temper their representations when
representing clients with relatively substantial power asks lawyers to be conscious and wary of
the way in which self-interest may affect ethical judgment. Where strong client pressure exists to
steam roller an overwhelmed opponent or stonewall a regulatory agency with limited resources,
an ethical norm that requires lawyers to resist the effects of client power serves as a
counterweight to the influences that may lead to over-aggressive client representation. On the
other hand, where lawyers are representing relatively poor or disadvantaged clients, the typical
moral hazard produced by self-interest is to do too little in light of clients’ inability to pay for
superior services. In this practice context, an norm that insists on zealous, client-centered
advocacy corrects for the tug of self-interest that might otherwise lead lawyers to skimp on the
quality of representation or devotion to their client. In sum, correction of moral hazard problems
provides a strong and comprehensive justification for considering relative client power in
formulating context-specific legal ethics priorities.
The objection can be raised, of course, that lawyers will not follow a power-based
approach precisely because it too directly contravenes the tug of self-interest. Just as it
contravenes lawyers’ financial self-interest to give zealous, client-centered representation to poor
people who cannot afford to pay for such extraordinary devotion, it contravenes lawyers’
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business interests to temper their representations with concern about the public interest in
representing powerful corporate clients that can easily take their business elsewhere if they are
not satisfied with the aggressiveness of the representation they receive. But these objections can
be made about any legal ethics principle. The very reason some legal questions about lawyers’
conduct are labeled as “ethics” issues is that they require professional conduct other than that
which self-interest readily motivates.98 Although it may be hard to convince some lawyers to
engage in a power-based approach to the exercise of discretionary ethical judgment, it is no more
hard to do so than to convince lawyers to abide by other ethics principles. The problem of
lawyers’ self-interest should not be a reason to refrain from the development of principles that
have the most appropriate fit in relation to the objectives of ethics analysis.
4. Avoiding Lawyer Domination of Clients
A final reason for introducing considerations of relative client power into lawyers’ ethics
analysis relates to the problems inherent in pure justice-centered approaches to the extent that
they call on lawyers to impose their own substantive values on clients who cannot resist such
lawyer domination. As discussed in Part II-A-1, justice-centered theorists have been subjected
to withering critiques on the grounds that calls to lawyers to impose their substantive visions of
law or morality on clients amount to nothing more than indefensible paternalism, especially
where lawyers are representing relatively powerless clients who have few alternative options for
obtaining legal services. A theory that calibrates lawyers’ ethical priorities to context, however,
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avoids these charges because it calls on lawyers to insist on consideration of the public interest
only with respect to clients who have the option to take their legal business elsewhere. And, of
course, as Gordon has perhaps most eloquently pointed out,99 the force of moral suasion may
lead these clients to follow -- and indeed even to greatly value -- their lawyers’ advice on these
matters. Indeed, the ideal justice-centered theorists picture is that moral suasion will operate
effectively in relationships between trusted lawyers and their clients-- an outcome that clients
with alternative legal representation options may value far more than nay-sayers typically
assume.
In any event, evaluation of clients’ relative power as a factor in lawyers’ ethics analysis
moves the focus away from demands that lawyers impose their own substantive determinations
of legal merits or substantive morality on their cases, and towards calls on lawyers to concern
themselves about whether their representation tactics are steam hollering substantially less
powerful interests affected by their representation.
Here again, obvious objections arise. Are not, one might ask, determinations about
relative power in particular contexts as difficult and contested as are questions of justice based on
interpretations of the purposes of law or on moral considerations? For example, how should
relative power be determined? Should it be based on access to material resources, political
access, membership in social networks of privilege, a combination of these indices, and/or other
factors?100 Should it be analyzed relatively; absolutely; in top-down terms, as the ability to
command; or as something that circulates and is never wholly absent or wholly secure, as a
99
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Foucauldian would posit? But these questions, while important, need not be answered
definitively for my proposal to work, for the following important reason: assessments of relative
power become more difficult only as imbalances of power, apparent on any measure, become
less significant. In cases of substantial power imbalance – such as indigent criminal defendants
against the state, moderate-income neighborhoods against corporate polluters, or poor tenants
against landlords – the analysis of relative power will be readily apparent under any definition,
and it is precisely in these cases that lawyers’ ethics analysis should be influenced by
considerations of client power. Where the affected parties or interests are more evenly matched,
on the other hand, the power-based analysis has less concern about the content of lawyers’ ethical
norms, as I will discuss further in Part IV-E.
In short, consideration of client power offers a contribution to pure justice-based theories
because questions of justice become all the more difficult in the close cases. Under a justicebased approach the problem of lawyers’ exercise of unduly subjective ideas of justice is
exacerbated in precisely those settings in which the exercise of such judgment, if not sufficiently
justified by consensus or objective warrant, becomes the most, rather than the least, problematic.
But a power-based view, which adjusts the choice between client- versus justice-centered models
depending on the relative power of the client, avoids critiques based on lawyer domination of
those clients least able to resist, while retaining the objective of stopping lawyers from assisting
powerful clients in undermining law’s public purposes.

IV.

APPLYING A POWER-BASED ANALYSIS
In this section I illustrate a power-based analysis more concretely by applying it to several
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categories of hypotheticals. The first category consists of legal representation in cases involving
adversaries or affected interests of substantially unequal power. These are the scenarios in which
consideration of power as a factor in legal ethics analysis is most important. A second is in
representations of clients against the government, in which context I argue that consideration of
client power should continue to be a factor in lawyers’ ethical judgment calls. I also discuss
examples of how a power-based analysis might work with respect to several popular
hypotheticals involving procedural and evidentiary issues.
A. Representations Involving Adversaries of Unequal Power
In a first category of representations involving lawyers representing less powerful clients
against more powerful interests, a power-based approach calls on the lawyer to exercise her
ethical discretion in favor of the most vigorous attention to the client’s self-articulated
perspective and to advancing her client’s interests. In contrast, lawyers for more powerful clients
should exercise their ethical discretion against exploiting available legal strategies in ways that
interfere with the ability of less powerful interests affected by the representation to have their
positions considered in the legal process. The lawyer for the more powerful client should still
present her client’s substantive perspective, of course, but should temper her presentation with an
eye to allowing full consideration of the interests of less powerful constituencies.
In the hypotheticals that follow I discuss just a few such examples, borrowing primarily
from scenarios other legal ethics scholars have already offered so as both to illustrate my
proposed approach more concretely and highlight its contrasts to pure justice- and client-centered
views. A host of other examples also could have been used; my selection is somewhat arbitrary
and certainly under-inclusive of the wide range of situations calling for context-specific ethical
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judgment along the axis of client power. Drawing on the insights of client-centered analysis, I
envision the process of moral dialogue between client and lawyer that should occur. I also
highlight, as justice-centered ethics theorists do, the ultimate decision to withdraw from the
representation that the lawyer representing powerful interests should make if consensus with the
client about other-regarding concern in a particular situation ultimately cannot be achieved.
Critics point to this necessary consequence of the justice-centered approach – i.e., the prospect
that a lawyer ultimately may be required to withdraw from a representation – as proof of its
impracticality.101 But, as I have already discussed in Part III-B-3, this cannot be a reason for
discarding otherwise appropriate and justified principles for ethical conduct. The very concept of
ethics suggests that there is a line that lawyers will desire to, but should not, cross. It is, indeed,
the existence of such lines--explained thoroughly to the client at the outset of the representation,
of course--that signals the existence of ethics principles at all.
Hypothetical One:

In his recent important article, Wendel offers the example of a lawyer for a

coal company who is representing the company in a case involving a claim for black lung
benefits by a miner suffering from black lung disease.102 In the first iteration of the hypothetical,
the miner has a lesion on his lung which measures 1.5 cm, which is sufficiently large to entitle
him to benefits under the statute.103 Wendel concludes, and I agree, that the lawyer for the
company should concede that the miner is entitled to benefits, even though his client wishes to
101
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avoid paying benefits wherever possible because doing so puts it at a competitive disadvantage
relative to foreign competitors that do not have to pay benefits to black lung disease victims.
In a second iteration of this hypothetical, Wendel imagines that the miner has received a
lung transplant and is receiving powerful drugs to prevent a rejection of the transplanted organ,
which he is able to afford only because he receives black lung benefits. A creative client
representative suggests that the lawyer argue that the miner’s benefits should be terminated,
because he no longer has a 1.5 cm lesion on his lung as required to trigger the statutory
presumption of disability. This would mean that the miner would have to establish his disability
through a lengthy administrative process, and in the meantime the company would be entitled to
terminate payment of benefits, at a substantial cost savings to it. The client representative
presses the lawyer to advance this argument, and Wendel asks what the lawyer should do.104
Wendel notes that under the dominant client-centered conception the lawyer should
follow the client representative’s instructions. Under Wendel’s legalist approach, however, the
lawyer should examine the purposes of the black lung benefits law in facilitating coordinated
social action with respect to the administration of these benefits, and should decline to file a
motion for termination of benefits. The stable and clear meaning of the statute leads to the
interpretation that it should cover miners who have received a lung transplant due to black lung
disease. Thus, Wendel notes, he arrives at the same conclusion as the moralists do, albeit
through a somewhat different path.105
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An approach that factors client power into the analysis arrives at the same conclusion as
both the legalists and moralists do, albeit by a different analytical route. Under a power-based
analysis, the lawyer should attempt first to persuade the client representative against insisting on
filing a motion to suspend benefits, but, if unable to do so, should decline to pursue the coal
company’s objectives in the scenario posed above. He should do so, however, not because he
believes the purpose of the law is clear, but because his client is the more powerful interest in the
situation. To be sure, this step may lead the client representative to seek new counsel. But the
lawyer’s position should not come as a complete surprise to the mining company, provided that
the lawyer has explained at the outset of the representation that he subscribes to an ethics view
that calls on him to avoid steam-rolling less powerful interests. Although this disclosure may
cause the lawyer to lose some potential business, it may be attractive to clients who wish to
enhance their public reputation by signaling agreement with such public-regarding approaches to
legal disputes – an advantage to forcing a more public-regarding ethics by the bar that is vastly
underestimated in my view.106 In any event, under an analysis concerned about relative client
power, the lawyer declines to argue for the termination of benefits for the miner who has suffered
a lung transplant. The difference between this view and a justice-based approach can be
illustrated by varying the hypothetical once again, as follows:
Imagine the same set of facts, except this time, due to measurement variation or a slight
improvement in the miner’s condition, the miner’s most recent medical records show a slight
decrease in the size of his lesion, so that it is now appears to be slightly under the 1.5 cm
threshold for the statutory presumption of total disability, but still within the margin of possible
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measurement error. The lawyer for the coal company notices this and discusses it with his client.
The client representative instructs him to file a motion for termination of benefits.
Here, as in the situation of the lung transplant, the coal company lawyer should either
decline to file the motion despite his client’s urging. Even though the statutory purpose is clear
and calls for the interpretation that a 1.5 cm lesion is the intended threshold for a presumption of
disability, the lawyer should resolve close cases in favor of his client’s adversary, the miner,
because he has less overall power in the situation and great need for the benefits provided when
the coal company does not dispute the presumption of disability.
Of course, slippery slope arguments can be made: What if the miner’s lesions measure
only 1 cm, or .75 cm, or even less? At what point does the coal company’s lawyer cease to stay
his hand in arguing that the miner is not entitled to take advantage of the statutory presumption of
disability? The answer to this question should be calibrated to the situation: the lawyer should
resolve ambiguous or close questions in favor of the less powerful interests involved, but may
make tempered arguments pointing out that the requirements for the statutory presumption are
not met, and may make these arguments more forcefully to the extent that the issue becomes less
ambiguous or close to the line. In other words, the lawyer may point out that the miner has
failed to meet the statutory presumption when this is clearly and obviously the correct
interpretation of the facts, even though he should refrain from or substantially temper such
arguments in close or ambiguous cases.
In contrast, consider the case of the lawyer for the miner. Must the lawyer for the miner
point out the weakness in his client’s case in the situation in which the lesion appears to be
slightly under the 1.5 cm threshold? On a legalist account, the lawyer must do so, because this is
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the clear intent of the statute: miners are entitled to the statutory presumption of disability only if
they meet the statutorily defined threshold. Under a power-based analysis, however, the lawyer
need not do so–within the range of evidentiary ambiguity–because her client is the less powerful
party. Again, this is not to say that the lawyer may suborn perjury or falsify evidence, but simply
that, in that important and sometimes quite wide area of ethical discretion in close and
ambiguous cases that Simon has persuasively identified, the factor of client power should lead
the lawyer to resolve close judgment calls in favor of her relatively less powerful adversary.
Of course here the moral issues are fairly clear: an individual is suffering from an illness
caused by his work for a company that has profited from it, and he thus can be argued from a
moralist viewpoint to be entitled to benefits in light of the overall justice of the situation. But the
power-based view offers benefits to legal ethics analysis even in contexts where the relative
weight of moral considerations is more ambiguous, as in Hypothetical Two below.
Hypothetical Two: Another helpful employment law case, this time one that Simon discusses at
length in his book, involves a labor law question.107 Simon presents the facts in rich and
realistic detail. A labor union represents the clerical and technical workers at a wealthy private
university. The workers previously had been organized as a single employer local, but then
merged with a larger local representing workers from several employers. The merger did not
work out well, however, and the union and university workers’ leaders agreed that the university
workers should revert back to a single employer local. The larger local disclaimed interest in
representing the university workers and purported to delegate its representative function back to
107
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the reconstituted university local. The reconstituted local held an election of bargaining unit
members, who ratified the new arrangement by a five-to-one margin with 55% of those eligible
voting.108
On advice of counsel, however, the university now refuses to recognize the reconstituted
local or to deduct union dues under the check-off provisions of the collective bargaining
agreement. The university argues that the larger local could not transfer its representative
authority to another entity without a representation election supervised by the National Labor
Relations Board. The union is strongly opposed to this proposal for many reasons. It argues that
holding such an election is unnecessary in light of the results of its internal vote and would be
very burdensome to the union in terms of time, effort and money. It would require the union to
resist anti-union campaigning by the employer and would also expose the union to possible
challenges from other unions competing to represent the university’s workers. The employer
could also contest the results of the representation election through proceedings before the NLRB
that could take years to resolve. The union’s only recourse against the university would be to file
a complaint with the NLRB, arguing that the university is improperly failing to observe the
check-off provisions of the collective bargaining agreement, but this claim would also take a
great deal of money and time to resolve. Simon’s question is whether the lawyer for the
university should go forward in filing the demand for a representation election.109
Simon’s conclusion is that the university lawyer should not file the petition challenging
the union’s claim to legitimately represent the workers. This is because the problem arose from
108
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procedural irregularities and carelessness on the part of the union’s leaders, but not from any real
concern that the local’s representation is not genuinely representative of the bargaining unit
members’ wishes. On a justice-based view, the university lawyer has responsibility to assess the
substantive merits of the university’s argument against the purposes of the National Labor
Relations Act. This assessment should lead the lawyer to conclude that the university’s argument
is supported only by “formal considerations that undercut the relevant statutory purposes,” and
the lawyer therefore should not press the claim.110 Simon recognizes that the issues involved are
complex, and that the analysis changes depending on how one characterizes the perspectives of
the union and management and how one casts or weighs the complex, multiple aspects of the
statutory purposes involved. But, he concludes, on balance, that the university lawyer should
stay her hand, in part because she “should recognize that she has a bias in the matter and that
there are limitations on her knowledge of the union.”111
Invoking the potential for lawyer bias seems somewhat problematic in this and many
other examples of justice-based analysis, however, because of the very small difference in many
situations between bias and situated perspective. What might to one person appear to be bias is
another’s compelling truth. In Simon’s scenario, for example, many of the justifications the
university offers for its perspective would appear eminently persuasive to some observers–such
as that the local is out of touch with its membership, is not representing the workers well, has
within it dissidents whose views deserve a chance to be heard, may have pressured voters in its
internal vote, and in general deserves to face a test of its support in which members can
110
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reconsider their interests and the university can counter the deceptions the union has made in the
past.112 Indeed, the inevitability of strongly diverging situated perspectives formed by
socialization in particular practice contexts is a point on which commentators have challenged
Simon, and one to which Simon has failed to offer an adequate response.113
A power-based perspective, in contrast, offers a cleaner analysis. The power-based view
agrees with a justice-based analysis in the above situation, but for a different reason. The justicecentered analysis posits that the university lawyer should not challenge the representation petition
because she has reason to believe that a majority of the union’s members do support
representation and the public purposes underlying the procedures for challenging union
representation claims exist to resolve legitimate doubts on this question. Adding the factor of
relative client power leads to the conclusion that the university lawyer should not challenge the
union’s representation claim because lawyers for more powerful clients should resolve close
ethical questions with an eye to protecting the interests of the less powerful adversary.
Here again, the decision must of course be made in consultation with the client
representative, and in the course of that consultation the lawyer may learn facts that change the
analysis. It may appear that there is a minority in the union’s membership whose interests the
union is failing to represent, and that attention to the interests of this less powerful constituency
within the union militates in favor of challenging the union’s assertion of continued
representation authority. Finally, the client representative’s position with the employer very
likely will color her statement of the facts, and the lawyer will be required to assess the factors at
112
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work in shaping the representative’s depiction. The lawyer must of course make judgment calls
within a realm of uncertainty on all such matters, and has every right to give his client the benefit
of a doubt along the way. But consideration of client power calls on the lawyer to seek to avoid
using legal processes in ways that interfere with the ability of less powerful interests to receive
due attention to the substantive merits of their legal positions – including not forcing unnecessary
expenditures of legal resources to test claims that have little validity. Where the lawyer’s best
judgment is that the client is seeking to do this, the lawyer should insist to the point of possible
withdrawal from the representation that such tactics not be pursued.
Thus a model that factors in client power, like justice-based approaches, asks lawyers to
act with an eye to ultimate justice, but in a different manner and sometimes with different results.
The difference between power-based and substantive justice-based approaches can be further
demonstrated by once again altering the hypothetical. Imagine that the lawyer making the ethical
judgment call is the lawyer for the union. Imagine, further, that this lawyer has strong reason to
believe that the union in fact may no longer enjoy the support of a majority of the local’s
members. Should the lawyer stay her hand and decline to use the strategies available to resist
management’s call for a decertification vote?
Simon’s answer must be yes: the union lawyer, recognizing that the purposes underlying
the procedures for requesting representation votes are designed to detect the true wishes of
bargaining unit members, should decline to engage in strategies available to her – which, in my
former practice experience, generally involved slowing down the time line for holding such an
election by vigorously searching out and filing potentially meritorious unfair labor practice
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charges.114 Indeed, speaking now as a former union-side labor lawyer involved in representing
union locals in decertification cases in an era of declining union membership, I will openly
confess that I find such a justice-focused position unsettling as tested against the intuitions
developed through immersion in an actual practice context. No union-side labor lawyer worth
that title would have conceded a decertification case simply because it was reasonably clear that
the eventual result would be loss of the bargaining unit – doing so would mean the loss of
significant resources in terms of years of additional dues, egg on the union’s face, and the
potential for spiraling losses as news of one successful decertification campaign spread to other
locals. Of course, the intuitions of lawyers socialized into particular practice contexts cannot be
the guide to ethical appropriateness in general – that lack of reflectivity is, indeed, the
phenomenon the many schools of critical legal ethics scholars identified in Part I are seeking to
resist. But the legalists’ failure to capture the moral intuition that more zealousness is due the
representation of the client’s interests in the context of representations of the underdog in many
situations is a factor deserving of further analysis.
Hypothetical Three: Here is another example, again drawn in very general terms from my own
former practice experience. Imagine a predominantly white union local sued by an AfricanAmerican member on duty of fair representation (dfr) charges. The member alleges that the
leaders of the local illegitimately blocked him and other African Americans from running for
leadership positions in the local. The lawyer’s investigation gives her reason to suspect that there
is at least some merit to the union member’s allegations. The lawyer has considerable
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experience in handling and securing the dismissal of dfr claims. Should the lawyer zealously
pursue the dismissal of such charges?
My answer in this situation is no– in comparison to the union member, the union local is
the more powerful party and the lawyer should exercise her ethical discretion in favor of
protecting the interests of the African American union members and against vigorous advocacy
of the interests of her client, the union local, in early dismissal of the case. Again, this is not to
say that the lawyer should abdicate representation of the union local, but only that the lawyer
should resolve close judgment calls in favor of the less powerful adversary. Here again, both
legalist and moralist justice-centered ethicists would agree. But a power-based approach works
better because it accounts for both the moral intuition that the union lawyer should fight
zealously against the management-sponsored decertification election and that she should not
adopt this stance against the potentially meritorious race discrimination claim filed by the local’s
African American members. One context calls for a client-centered approach but the other for
the opposite, and the power relationship between the parties explains this difference.
A moralist might argue that what accounts for the difference in the two cases is the more
morally problematic nature of seeking to defeat a potentially meritorious race discrimination
claim as compared to contesting a potentially legitimate argument for union decertification. But
any such argument must assume relatively broad consensus on moral questions, which in fact
does not exist on the union decertification question, as I have already noted. To some, a union’s
continued claim to representation status when it lacked majority support would be morally
problematic indeed. Moreover, the duty of fair representation hypothetical works even for a far
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less morally weighted dfr claim with no race issues involved.115
Hypothetical Four: A final example that demonstrates the differences among the clientcentered, justice-centered, and power-based approaches comes from zealous representation
advocate Monroe Freedman’s divorce representation hypothetical, as borrowed by Simon in
order to highlight the contrasts between Freedman and himself.116 In Freedman’s scenario, a
lawyer represents a husband seeking a divorce from his wife. The wife asks the husband for
financial information, and the lawyer knows that the husband has income about which the wife is
unaware. The wife is represented by a “bomber” lawyer, however, who “has no value in life
other than stripping the husband of every penny and piece of property he has, at whatever cost to
the personal relation and children, or anything else.”117 Freedman argues that the lawyer should
not disclose his client’s confidence because it is not the role of the lawyer to be a conduit of
information to his client’s adversary; other aspects of the legal system are designed to provide the
machinery for uncovering falsehood.
Simon agrees with Freedman’s conclusion, but for different reasons. Simon argues that
“since the disclosure of the husband’s actual income to the bomber may prompt escalation of the
already unfair demands,” it may be appropriate to defer disclosure until it becomes clear
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“whether the case is likely to be resolved fairly without it.”118 On a power-based analysis, in
contrast, the lawyer for the more powerful client, which the hypothetical implies is the husband,
should provide the information, even if the lawyer for the wife appears to be a bomber. Indeed,
the lawyer representing the less powerful client – in Freedman’s hypothetical, apparently the wife
– should in circumstances of significant inequality of resources be more “bomber”-like, seeking
maximum economic resources and other advantages for her client even though it would be
ethically inappropriate for the husband to do so.
This hypothetical takes on particular significance in light of recent detailed empirical
research into the practice context of divorce law. In an excellent recent study of divorce law
practice in several small New England towns, Lynn Mather et al. document the intra-professional
dynamics produced by the introduction of a new generation of women lawyers, many of whom
came with ideologically driven, feminist motivations to their work, into a practice community
best described as having been in the past a “good ole boys” club.119 The old-timer members of
this formerly staid practice community, cognizant of their need to go back to the same small
group of other practitioners in future cases, had developed informal practice norms that frowned
upon aggressive positions in discovery and negotiations. The new female lawyers, in contrast,
who tended to represent women in divorce cases, eschewed these collegial practice norms,
refused to take the husbands’ lawyers at their word about financial asset and other suspect
information, and began making onerous discovery demands, leading the old timers to brand them
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as unduly aggressive and lacking in collegiality.120
This empirical example is rich with implications for legal ethics theory.121 For my
purposes here, its main lesson is that behavior that appears to reflect overly aggressive clientcentered lawyering from the perspective of lawyers comfortable in a traditional practice
communities may appear from another practice perspective to be necessary zealous advocacy in
the interests of the underdog. From this vantage point, denunciations of zealous, client-centered
ethics appear tinged with self-interested bias and the privileging of the interests supported by the
status quo.
Hypothetical Five: A final example, discussed over the years by many ethics commentators,
involves David Dudley Field’s representation of Jim Fisk and Jay Gould in the Erie Railroad
scandals of the 1860s. The scandals involved fraudulent stock manipulations, looting of
company assets, and bribery and corruption of the state legislature. Although it does not appear
that Field took part in or assisted his clients in any such illegal conduct, he mounted an
aggressive legal defense of them. In justification for his zealous representation, Field invoked
Lord Erskine’s defense of Tom Paine when he was charged with seditious libel after publishing
The Rights of Man, including Lord Erskine’s famous speech championing the need for lawyers’
independence and zealous advocacy in order to protect civil liberties.122 Simon correctly points
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out the inappropriateness of Field’s comparison of his representation posture to Lord Erskine’s in
the Paine case in light of the very different contexts in which the two representations took
place.123
But Simon’s analysis of this difference is unpersuasive. According to Simon, the
important difference in the Fisk and Gould case was “procedural failure that triggers
responsibility to assess substantive merit.”124 But this does not fully explain the intuition that
there is an important difference between the two examples, because there were significant
procedural concerns in the Paine case as well, but in that case those concerns were reason for
more zealous representation. Instead, the underlying reason that called for justice-centeredness
in the Fisk and Gould case was the power of these clients to use their huge financial resources to
corrupt the legislature and otherwise exploit and manipulate procedures to further their nefarious
ends. In the Paine case, in contrast, the problems with the fallibility and potential weaknesses of
procedural protections were dangerous to Paine, not to the public interest. In other words, the
real difference between the two cases was that the power imbalance in the Paine case – a
powerful government against an unpopular individual – favored zealous advocacy in favor of the
relatively powerless client, whereas the power analysis in the Fisk and Gould situation favored
public-regarding attention to the interests of stockholders and the public.
B. Representation of Clients Against the Government
The same considerations explain the strong moral intuition that zealous client advocacy is
appropriate in representing an individual against the power of the state. Adding a focus on
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relative client power in particular situations into the analysis, however, suggests that this
presumption should not always hold, especially in representations of powerful organizational
clients against government lawyers with comparatively limited resources.
1. Representation of Powerful Interests Against the Government
Simon, Wendel, Gordon and others use many examples involving the representation of
powerful clients against the government to illustrate the merits of a justice-centered view.
Classic chestnuts of this type include post-mortem commentary on the Savings and Loan crisis of
the 1980s125 and the involvement of lawyers in the Enron collapse more recently.126 In all of
these examples, justice-centered theorists, whether legalists or moralists, agree that the lawyers
should have been far less zealous on their clients’ behalf and should have served far more of a
law-protecting role. A power-based view agrees with this analysis, but for different reasons.
The reason the lawyers should have been less zealous in their advocacy for their clients in
these situations is not simply that they should have sought to preserve the purposes of law or
morality, but also because, in context, vis-a-vis government agencies with relatively limited
personnel resources for investigation of corporate wrongdoing, these lawyers’ corporate clients
were in some respects the more powerful entity, or at least had much more equivalency of
resources in terms of their ability to evade detection of wrongdoing by government agencies
engaged in compliance monitoring and civil enforcement actions. In such situations, involving
government investigations of powerful entities that can outmatch or at least rival the resources of
state and even federal law enforcement agencies, the lawyer for a powerful private client should
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exercise discretion against exploiting tactical advantages for his client and in favor of protecting
the public policy interests the government is seeking to uphold.
2. Criminal Defense Representations
A power-based analysis also does a much better job than its alternatives in explaining
why criminal defense is different. Although Simon,127 Luban128 and others have attempted to
resolve the puzzle presented by our strong moral intuition that criminal defense is in fact
different, commentators have not found these attempts at distinguishing the criminal defense
context convincing.129 A power-based analysis, on the other hand, has no difficulty explaining
why criminal defense is, in most situations, different: it is different because, when the
government is pursuing an individual defendant, the government has access to the
overwhelmingly potential force of state power. Especially in cases of indigent defendants, but
also in cases of well-off criminal defendants such as O.J. Simpson, the potential power of the
government relative to that of the defendant is huge indeed. But here again, the criminal defense
lawyer should sometimes take into account the relative balance of power vis-a-vis the interests
she is opposing. Some tactics may be fair game but others not. In the O.J. Simpson case, for
example, the government possessed extraordinary powers to enter into Simpson’s property and to
conduct searches and seizures at that property and at the crime scene – and, potentially, to abuse
those powers by planting evidence or similar tactics. Simpson’s defense team was, accordingly,
well justified in its zealous attempts to cast doubt on the reliability of the evidence obtained
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through these extraordinary government powers. In contrast, Simpson possessed superior
resources with respect to the quality, experience, and talent of his defense team, as compared to
obviously out-matched prosecutorial team of Marcia Clark and Christopher Darden. In this
arena, in which O.J.’s resources and power were superior to those of the government, Simpson’s
lawyers ethically were not entitled to engage in tactics such as blizzarding the government with
motions to which the government lacked sufficient resources to respond.
In a third scenario, the criminal defense lawyer is representing a defendant with respect to
pretrial release. The lawyer has reason to believe her client is a threat to vulnerable persons in
the community if released, but also must consider the advantages of pretrial release to the
defendant in preparing a defense. Here the lawyer faces a difficult ethical dilemma. Contrary to
other approaches, which simply assert that criminal defense is different, a power-based analysis
could call on the lawyer to weigh her client’s relative powerlessness as against the state against
her client’s potential threat to vulnerable members of the outside community. On the other hand,
this is the judge’s role in the pre-trial release hearing, and to the extent that the judge can be
counted on to perform it adequately the lawyer can focus on the need to defend her client against
the power of the state. But in situations in which the lawyer is better situated to make judgments
about danger to the community than is the court – as, for example, when the lawyer has
information about her client’s intent to cause harm that the court does not know – a power-based
approach may call on the lawyer to adjust the zealousness of her representation to take account of
the interests threatened by it.
This result clashes dramatically with criminal defenders’ legal ethics sensibilities. As
many have pointed out to me, there are almost always vulnerable victims somewhere in the
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potential ambit of concern in criminal cases, and a criminal defender could virtually never giver
her client zealous advocacy if she were attempting to balance these interests against her client’s.
It may well be that the criminal defense context is different because of the important individual
rights issues, highlighted through classical liberal analysis,130 that are at stake when natural
beings face the force of the state. Moreover, an ethics stance that mandates that criminal defense
lawyers engage in zealous client-centered advocacy may be justified on rule utilitarian grounds.
Because zealous advocacy is usually due criminal defendants as against the potentially powerful
force of the state, it is best to call on criminal defense lawyers to adopt this stance in all aspects
of their representations.
In sum, although I confess to some continuing ambivalence on this question, I am at this
point willing to agree that a bright-line rule of zealous advocacy is appropriate in defending
natural persons in the criminal justice context, largely because such an irrebutable presumption
serves to “hard wire” defense counsel to adopt the ethics stance that is most often appropriate.
In all events, a power-based analysis suggests that criminal defense is not different in all
respects or all contexts. This is most obvious under a power-based analysis in contexts involving
government prosecutions of corporate crime. In this situation, criminal defense lawyers should
possess some of the duties justice-centered advocates recognize in the civil context, especially
with regard to avoiding the exploitation of strategic opportunities – through stonewalling and the
like – that interfere with the government’s ability to enforce the law.
C. Procedural and Evidentiary Matters
Another set of issues on which to test the results of applying a power-based analysis
130

See supra Part III-B-2.

-59-

concerns lawyers’ ethical deliberations in procedural and evidentiary matters. To take one
classic dilemma: A lawyer has reason to believe she can impeach a handwriting expert who
tends to be nervous on the stand by surreptitiously substituting a writing with a signature
different from the one the expert witness had previously identified. The client-centered
advocacy view tends to permit such tactics; the justice-centered approach tends to disapprove of
them.131 The justice-based approach asks whether the tactic would help the judge or jury decide
the case fairly. If the lawyer believes the expert witness has correctly identified the handwriting,
she should not attempt the impeachment tactic because it will “impede rather than enhance the
adjudicator’s ability to decide fairly.”132 But if the lawyer has good reason to believe the
contrary, she may appropriately decide to use the tactic because it will contribute to a fair
decision. The power based approach, in contrast, would respond to context adding as a factor
for consideration the relative balance of power between the two parties. This explains, for
example, the moral intuition that it would be appropriate to engage in deceptive impeachment
tactics when representing a criminal defendant, but completely inappropriate to do so if a
prosecutor.
In short, while Simon says that a justice-oriented lawyer should respond to procedural
defects by trying to mitigate them, and “[t]o the extent that the lawyer cannot neutralize defects,
she should assume direct responsibility for the substantive validity of the decision,” by forming
her “own judgment about the proper substantive resolution and tak[ing] reasonable actions to
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bring it about,”133 consideration of client power leads to a different approach. It does not call on
the lawyer to enter into the murky realm of substantive validity determinations, but instead asks
to temper their representations to the extent that they threaten to prevent consideration of the
interests of less powerful affected parties.
D. Representation of Interests Substantially Equal in Power
A final category of representations involve those in which lawyers are representing
adversaries of relatively equal power and no other significant interests are at stake. Here we
might imagine transactional work involving similarly situated parties or corporate insurance
litigation, for example. To be sure, even in such representations, “little guy” interests may be
affected, and to that extent, consideration of client power should be a factor in lawyers’
resolution of close ethical judgment calls. But to the extent that obvious and substantial power
disparities do not appear to be hampering the fairness of the representation, lawyers need not
worry about relative client power in making ethical judgment calls.
Another example of a situation in which consideration of client power will not provide a
helpful guide in lawyers’ ethical deliberations is in the representation of competing interests that
are substantially similar in that all have relatively little power. The scenario of a public interest
lawsuit in which many interests, none with substantially disproportionate power, are at stake 134
comes to mind. Here, too, the balance of power among lawyers, clients, and affected individuals
133

SIMON, supra note 33, at 140.

134

For an example of such a situation, see Fiandaca v. Cunningham, 827 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1987) (conflict of
interest problem raised where the remedy sought by New Hamsphire Legal Assistance (“NHLA”) on behalf of a
client class of female inmates in the state prison, which would have involved building a new facility for them with
programs and services equivalent to those provided to male inmates, would interfere with the interests of another
NHLA client class, consisting of citizens with mental retardation, whose sole care and treatment facility would have
provided the site for building this facility for the women inmates).

-61-

is sufficiently complex and multi-sided as to render a power-based analysis unhelpful – except,
of course, as to interests such as those represented by competing organizations that have
substantially fewer material or social resources at their disposal.135 But in those aspects of cases
involving relatively balanced or impenetrably complex power relationships among competing
interests, a power-based analysis cannot guide the ethics stance that lawyers should apply.
Again, questions instantly arise as to how large this set of such representations involving
complex and multi-sided power relationship may be. In the new post-post-modern paradigm,
theorists have begun to emphasize the flux and instability of power relations in many such
scenarios. But the empirical question of how broad is the range of cases involving obvious and
substantial imbalances of power need not be resolved here. The point is simply that in that range
of cases, considerations of client power should factor into lawyers’ ethical deliberations.
In situations that fall outside the substantial power-imbalance paradigm, other ethics
considerations must apply. In middle-of-the-road cases, it may well be that lawyers should be
free to set their norms of ethical practice by agreement. These may be zealous advocacy norms,
norms calling for polite deference to opposing counsel, or postures somewhere in between.
Moreover, in these cases, context-dependent problems of moral hazard with respect to lawyers’
orientation to their client vis-a-vis other affected interests are not as great. Accordingly, the need
for an ethics norm that arises from concern about the effects of power on the working of the legal
system is not as great either.
This point can be further illustrated by considering several hypotheticals in which power
considerations are too complex for a power-based analysis to apply. Consider, for example, the
135
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representation of organizations dedicated to advancing “pro-choice” or “pro-life” positions on the
abortion issue. Here it is not clear which group currently has more social, economic and political
power. Wendel’s analysis of precisely this question under his version of a legalist approach
provides a helpful answer: Because both groups are relatively well represented in political
processes, the lawyer’s appropriate ethical role should be to adopt an relatively evenhanded
stance.136 In this situation, viewed from the perspective of the relative power of the two political
groups involved – as from the legalists’ concern with procedural reliability, which is the focus of
Wendel’s analysis – lawyers’ ethical deliberation need not concern itself with distortions
potentially caused by imbalance in the political power of the client groups they represent.
This example is particularly interesting, however, because it also illustrates how a powerbased analysis accommodates pluralist substantive views on moral issues in a way that pure
justice-centered approaches cannot. Lawyers with particular ethical convictions might see the
situation as something quite different from what Wendel sees as a battle between groups with
adequate procedural and political access. A lawyer who believes abortion is murder, for
example, will see the situation as involving the protection of the rights of powerless unborn
children.137 A lawyer who believes anti-abortion laws punish poor women will view his
appropriate ethics stance as requiring zealous advocacy on behalf of the beneficiaries of laws that
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permit abortion. But under an approach that calls on lawyers to consider clients’ relative power
in the representation it does not matter that different people with different moral convictions
would likely also see differently questions concerning power. There is no reason the results of
lawyers’ consideration of their client relative power must be the same for all lawyers. Instead,
what is helpful about considering relative client power is that this factor offers a coherent
criterion to help guide lawyers’ exercise of discretionary judgment in a direction most likely to
correct for the tug of self-interest and the distortion of legal processes by over-zealous
representation, while also allowing for the irresolveable pluralism of people’s moral and political
views.
Another example a friendly critic has offered me: consider the situation presented in
Payne v. Tennessee.138 There the defendant committed a brutal murder of a mother and young
child and attempted murder of a surviving child. The grandmother testified at a death penalty
sentencing proceeding as to the painful effect on the surviving child’s life of the loss of his
mother and sister. The Supreme Court accepted certiorari to consider constitutional questions
related to the admission of victim impact statements in capital sentencing proceedings. The U.S.
government argued in favor of the admissibility of such statements; some state governments
argued against them. How would a power analysis work here?
At the U.S. Supreme Court level, a power analysis would have little applicability. The
setting calls for a vigorous and unrestrained airing of all substantive arguments expert advocates
can craft, pro and con. But in a context without all the trappings of a highly public, sharply
focused, national-level debate about the development of principles of public reason, a more
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careful consideration of power dynamics would be warranted. The lawyer for the defendant
facing the death penalty obviously should provide unreservedly zealous representation for his
client. The prosecutor in this situation, to my mind, would justifiably weigh the probable harm
to future community members strongly in the balance in urging consideration of victim impact
testimony. The state and federal government positions reflect analyses of the positions of those
authorized within both levels of government to determine questions of legal policy, and to my
mind should not weigh significantly in one direction or the other on a power-based analysis.
E. Considering Intangible Interests
Another set of interesting hypotheticals raise the question of how lawyers should take into
account intangible interests, such as the interests in avoiding the perpetuation of negative racial
stereotyping,139 or improving racial relations,140 or preventing harm to the environment.141
These intangible interests often are not attached to particular parties or persons and become all
the more fragile by virtue of this fact. But the fact that such interests are intangible does not
mean that they cannot be factored into the ethical calculations of lawyers representing powerful
clients. Among such important, fragile, yet nevertheless fully cognizable interests lawyers for
powerful clients would be ethically charged with protecting under my model are interests in
preserving the public access to information and knowledge and other aspects of the public
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commons,142 avoiding environmental harms,143 and protecting against financial harm that will be
borne by future generations. To be sure, in these contexts, especially, a power-based analysis
becomes very much like a justice-centered analysis because the lawyer is thinking about the
balance of affected interests – much like a judge thinks about justice – removed from the
presence of a tangible “other” capable of articulating a position to which the lawyer may show
consideration. But someone surely should be looking out for these interests in situations of
procedural breakdown or unreliability, as the justice-centered theorists have long and
persuasively argued, and it thus seems that a model that calls on lawyers to concern themselves
about these issues when representing powerful clients is well worth pursuing.
IV. CONCLUSION
A host of commentators, writing with a variety of intellectual commitments, have
criticized justice-centered assumptions that an ethics dictate involving the pursuit of justice can
be accomplished by applying discretionary judgment in interpreting law.144 Yet another critique,
drawn from post-modernism and liberalism alike, attacks notions of locating justice in
substantive morality. Even justice-centered theorists such as Simon and Wendel readily
acknowledge that law and justice cannot be equated in some realms.145 In these areas there
appears to be a fundamental injustice in positive law, or as Simon might put it, a disjunction
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between narrow positive law and more just norms which exist at a broader level in the legal
culture. At bottom, the dispute between justice- and client-based analyses may come down to no
more than different points of view about the general justice, validity, or trustworthiness of the
legal system overall. Legalists can be comfortable with a justice-based orientation to legal ethics
analysis because they view the legal system as fundamentally just, with some pockets of political
and or procedural breakdown; those in the rebellious lawyering tradition view such problematic
areas of law in the areas of criminal justice and welfare rights law as emblematic of a legal
system lacking in justice in more fundamental respects.
Put otherwise, a legalist analysis only works where, at bottom, law is fundamentally just.
To the extent that, or in those areas of law in which this claim cannot be supported, some other
theory is required. A power-based analysis offers such an alternative. When representing the
interests of those lacking in relative power, lawyers should seek to refrain from lawyer
domination, encourage the development of their clients’ perspectives, and engage in vigorous
client-centered representation. When representing clients with the power to do great harm to
those less powerful, on the other hand, lawyers should avoid strategies that interfere with full
consideration of less powerful interests affected by their representations. This context-specific
approach could well be codified through an overhaul of the model rules, but can and should be
adopted by lawyers even within the framework of the current rules in their exercise of
discretionary ethical judgment in the course of their legal representations.
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